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I. Introduction
The debate over property rights in New Zealand's foreshore'
and seabed2 began in 1840 with the signing of the Treaty of
Waitangi by the native Maori people and British colonists.3 The
1 The foreshore is defined as the beach land between the high and low water
marks, also known as the intertidal zone. See WAITANGI TRIBUNAL REPORT, REPORT ON
THE CROWN'S FORESHORE AND SEABED POLICY, No. Wai. 1071, at xi (2004),
http://www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/reports [hereinafter TRIBUNAL REPORT].
2 The seabed extends from the low water mark out to the sea. See id.
3 Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global
Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 70 (1999).
The Treaty of Waitangi is often referred to as the "founding document" (the "Magna
Carta") of New Zealand. Douglas Graham, The New Zealand Government's Policy, in
RECOGNISING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 3, 5 (Alison Quentin-Baxter ed.,
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debate continues today. Within the last year, the foreshore and
seabed dispute reached a climax, first with the courts,4 then New
Zealand's government,5 and finally an extra-judicial independent
commission6 all weighing in on the debate.
The controversy erupted following the New Zealand Court of
Appeal's' reversal of its own precedent in its June 2003 ruling in
Ngati Apa v. Attorney-General. In its 1963 decision in In re
Ninety Mile Beach,8 the Court held that "Maori customary title to
land depended 'wholly on the grace and favour' of the Crown." 9
Thus, under Ninety Mile Beach, no court had jurisdiction to hear
Maori customary title1" claims to the foreshore and seabed." In
Ngati Apa, the court reversed its holding in In re Ninety Mile
Beach and held that the Maori Land Court possessed jurisdiction
to hear Maori customary title claims to the foreshore and seabed.'
Outraged by the Court's decision in Ngati Apa, the ruling Labour
1998). The Treaty of Waitangi has three articles. Id. Briefly, Article I presents the
sovereignty question, discussed infra Part V. Article II "confirms and guarantees to the
Maori the full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of their lands and fisheries." Id.
Article III extends Crown protection to the Maori. Id.
4 Ngati Apa v. Attorney-General [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 643 (C.A.).
5 Dep't of Prime Minister and Cabinet, N.Z. Gov't, Foreshore and Seabed of New
Zealand: Protecting Public Access and Customary Rights, 1 (2003), available at
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/foreshore/docs/summary.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2004)
[hereinafter Foreshore and Seabed: A Framework].
6 TRIBUNAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xi.
7 At the time of the ruling in 2003, the Court of Appeal was the highest indigenous
appellate court in New Zealand. In June 2004, the new New Zealand Supreme Court
came into being to replace the Privy Council in London as the court of final appeal for
all New Zealand legal issues. See generally Noel Cox, The Abolition or Retention of the
Privy Council as the Final Court of Appeal for New Zealand: Conflict Between National
Identity and Legal Pragmatism, 20 N.Z.U.L. REv. 220 (2002).
8 [1963] N.Z.L.R. 461 (C.A.).
9 F.M. Brookfield, Maori Customary Title to Foreshore and Seabed, [2003] N.Z.
L. J. 295 (2003).
10 Maori customary title is defined as land that is "owned by Natives under their
customs or usages." This refers to land that was held by native Maori before the signing
of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 established British colonial governing authority.
Glossary, RECOGNISING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 3, at xviii
(Alison Quentin-Baxter, ed., 1998).
II Brookfield, supra note 9, at 295 (quoting In re Ninety Mile Beach [1963]




party (the "Government"' 3) promulgated a proposal to vititate the
Ngati Apa ruling and forbid new private ownership rights in the
foreshore and seabed.'4 Fierce opposition ensued, and a March
2004 report by the Waitangi Tribunal sharply rebuked the
Government's new foreshore and seabed policy, claiming that the
proposal breached Articles Two and Three of the Treaty of
Waitangi. 5
Part II of this Note will set the stage for exploring Ngati Apa
through a brief introduction to New Zealand's legal system. Part
III of this Note will examine the decision in Ngati Apa in
conjunction with a historical examination of the foreshore and
seabed debate. The Treaty of Waitangi and the Maori-Crown
relationship will be considered in the context of this important
decision. Part IV will track the Government's response to the
Ngati Apa decision. Part V will explore the role of the Waitangi
Tribunal in New Zealand's foreshore and seabed policy. Finally,
this Note will offer some brief remarks on the obligations of each
of the aforementioned institutions and their role in casting future
policy on the foreshore and seabed.
H. Setting the Stage for the Ngati Apa Debate
A description of New Zealand's legal landscape is necessary in
order to understand and better appreciate the importance of the
Court's decision in Ngati Apa and the government's reaction.
This Part first discusses New Zealand's system of Parliamentary
supremacy, followed by an examination of the Treaty of Waitangi,
the Waitangi Tribunal, and the history of Maori land ownership.
13 In New Zealand, the ruling party in Parliament is often referred to as the
"Government," or alternatively, the "Crown." New Zealand is a constitutional
monarchy, with the Queen of England as titular head of state. In the 1930s, the Statute
of Westminster granted virtual independence to New Zealand, and the Constitution Act,
passed by the British House of Commons in 1986, ceded complete autonomy. See Silvia
Cartwright, New Zealand's Constitutional Monarchy, 6 GREEN BAG 57, 58 (2002). No
legal oversight remains between New Zealand and Great Britain, though New Zealand
retains a "historical friendship" with Britain, as well as a membership in the
Commonwealth. Id.
14 See Foreshore Plans Will Lead to Countless New Claims, says Brownlee, N.Z.
HERALD, Mar. 8, 2004, available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz.
15 Waitangi Tribunal Report on Seabed and Foreshore, N.Z. NAT. Bus. REV., Mar.
8, 2003, available at http://www.nbr.co.nz/home.
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A. New Zealand's System of Parliamentary Supremacy
One unique feature of the New Zealand government is
Parliamentary supremacy. 16  Parliament is unlimited in its
lawmaking authority, even regarding questions of constitutional
importance.17  New Zealand inherited the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty from Great Britain.' 8 Under a system of
parliamentary sovereignty, "Parliament ... [has] the right to make
or unmake any law whatever; and further... no person or body is
recognized... as having a right to override or set aside the
legislation of Parliament."' 9  Parliament's sovereignty is not
thought to represent a conception of supreme power; rather,
Parliament is accepted as sovereign under the "common law rule
that courts will recognise as laws the rules which Parliament
makes by legislation., 20 Since New Zealand has "no fundamental
laws, no entrenched Bill of Rights, and no federal division of
powers," the net result is legislative supremacy.2' This supremacy
has allowed Parliament to make dramatic changes, such as
restructuring the appellate courts, without having to comport with
constitutional criteria.22 However, this supremacy is not without
16 MORAG McDOWELL & DUNCAN WEBB, THE NEW ZEALAND LEGAL SYSTEM:
STRUCTURES, PROCESSES AND LEGAL THEORY 3 (1998).
17 Id. Where might one locate New Zealand's constitution? McDowell and Webb
note that "New Zealand has a 'rich and vigorous' constitution embodied in both written
and unwritten material." Id. at 127 (quoting P. A. JOSEPH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 1 (1993)). The "constitutional structure" of
New Zealand is composed primarily of six sources: "rule of law; legislation (both of
New Zealand and United Kingdom origin); constitutional conventions; common law;
Letters; Patent; and the Treaty of Waitangi." Id.
18 Alison Quentin-Baxter, The International Law and Constitutional Law Contexts,
in RECoGNISING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 3, at 40.
19 Id. (quoting A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 39-
40 (9th ed.)).
20 Id. at 41.
21 PHILLIP A. JOSEPH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN NEW
ZEALAND 472 (2001). The New Zealand Court of Appeal has consistently affirmed this
view. "The constitutional position in New Zealand (as in the United Kingdom) is clear
and unambiguous. Parliament is supreme and the function of the courts is to interpret the
law as laid down by Parliament. The courts do not have a power to consider the validity
of properly enacted laws." Shaw v. Comm 'r of Inland Revenue, [1999] 3 N.Z.L.R. 154,
157 (quoting Rothmans of Pall Mall (NZ) Ltd v. Attorney-General [1991] 2 N.Z.L.R.
323, 330).
22 See JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 472.
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limits. Commentators have generally recognized, for instance,
that constitutional conventions dictate that Parliament should not
pass legislation that violates international law.23
B. The Treaty of Waitangi
The Treaty of Waitangi ("the Treaty"), signed in 1840,
governs the relationship between the Maori,24 the indigenous
people of New Zealand, and the European descendents, known as
"Pakeha," 25 who today constitute the overwhelming majority of
the population. 26  The British entered into the Treaty to provide
some justification for its continued presence in New Zealand.27
Hasty drafting, differing intents, and changes at fundamental
levels of society have resulted in countless battles between the
British and Maori over the true meaning of the Treaty.28
23 Quentin-Baxter, supra note 18, at 41.
24 Maori are thought to have been mariners from the Polynesian islands. Richard
B. Collins, Sacred Sites and Religious Freedom on Government Land, 5 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 241, 244 (2003). According to the latest census figures, New Zealand's ethnic
composition includes 14% Maori, 10% Asian, 6% Pacific Islanders, and 70% White, or
Pakeha. Marguerite L. Spencer, A White American Civil Rights Attorney in New
Zealand: What Maori Experience(s) Teach me about the Cause, 28 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 255, 257 (2001). Once a predominately rural people, Maori flocked to urban
centers in droves in the wake of the World War II economic boom. Id. at 259. Today,
80% of Maori live in cities, a statistic that has contributed to "cultural loses [and]
disenfranchisement of urban Maori from their tribal land and origins and socio-economic
difficulties ...." Id. at 260. As a result of this Maori diaspora, far too many Maori have
suffered tremendous socio-economic difficulties within the inner cities, in addition to
losses of cultural knowledge and familial ties. Id. at 260. Recently, some discussion of a
"Maori Party" in Parliament has taken place, undoubtedly in response to a perceived, and
very likely real, lack of attention to the Maori plight by the major political parties.
Feasibility of new Maori Party to be Explored, N.Z. HERALD, Mar. 7, 2003, available at
http://www.nzherald.co.nz.
25 Spencer, supra note 24, at 256 (describing a Pakeha as a "person of
predominately European descent").
26 Id. at 257; McDOWELL & WEBB, supra note 16, at 193. One eminent New
Zealand jurist referred to the Treaty of Waitangi as "simply the most important
document in New Zealand's history." Id. at 189 (quoting Cooke P., Introduction, Special
Waitangi Issue, 14 N.Z.U.L. REv. 1 (1990)).
27 John Buick-Constable, A Contractual Approach to Indigenous Self-
Determination in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 20 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L. J. 113, 133 (2002).
Treaties between states and indigenous peoples that purport to cede sovereignty have
often been lightning rods for controversy. Id. at 134. See infra notes 32-47.
28 McDOWELL & WEBB, supra note 16, at 189-94.
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At a fundamental level, precisely what power the Treaty ceded
to the Crown remains unclear. The British view the Treaty as
establishing the Crown's sovereignty over New Zealand.29 Maori
disagree, seeing the Treaty as a pact endowing the Maori with a
set of important rights in return for a concession to limited British
governance.3" Even courts have treated the issue inconsistently.
The Privy Council has consistently taken the British view of
cession of sovereignty, while the local New Zealand courts have
worked assiduously to avoid the issue where possible.3"
International law dictates that each language version of a treaty
be given full effect.32 As a result, the legal meaning of the Treaty
has been debated since the day of its signing, with little true
agreement being reached.33 The English language text of the
Treaty provided for a grant of full "sovereignty," while the Maori
version relinquishes "kawanatanga," which indicates a bestowal of
some amorphous right of governance on the English.34 The exact
nature of the grant was not precisely defined, probably due to
English ignorance of the Maori language in assuming
"sovereignty" equaled "kawanatanga," but historians generally
regard "kawanatanga" to be a grant of power somewhat less than
full "sovereignty."35  The Maori version further provides a
reservation of "rangatiratanga," which represents the idea that
Maori would be left "to own, use and manage Maori lands and
other resources according to Maori ways.,
36
In addition to the disagreement over the Treaty's meaning, it is
debatable whether the Treaty is a valid document under principles
of international law.37 To constitute a treaty of cession under
29 Id. at 197.
30 Id. Two treaties were signed: one in English and one in Maori. Id.
31 Id.
32 See REBECCA M. M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 230 (1992) (describing the
practices for interpreting treaties authenticated in two or more languages).
33 Kerry Howe, Treaty Text Leaves Readers Poles Apart, N.Z. HERALD, Mar. 18,
2004, available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz.
34 Wiessner, supra note 3, at 70.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Noel Cox, The Treaty of Waitangi and the Relationship Between the Crown and
Maori, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 123, 142.
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international law, the signing parties must possess: (1)
international legal personalities; (2) an intention to act under
international law; (3) an agreement; and (4) the intention to create
legal, not merely moral, obligations. 38  The pivotal question
remains whether the Maori people possessed an international legal
personality, otherwise known as statehood, at the time the Treaty
was signed.39 Many orthodox scholars argued that the signatory
Maori chiefs were unable, under international law standards, to
enter into a treaty of cession.4" In an authoritative text on the
subject, Lord McNair wrote:
According to the modern doctrine of international law, an
agreement made between a state and a native chief or tribe
cannot be regarded as a treaty in the international sense of the
term; nor can it be said that such an agreement produces the
41international legal effects commonly produced by a treaty.
Other writers have supported this interpretation and have argued
that since Maori chiefs were unable to enter into a treaty with the
British, the Treaty of Waitangi cannot, therefore, be "the legal
means whereby Great Britain acquired sovereignty in New
Zealand."42
Not surprisingly, a number of modem writers have argued
precisely the opposite. Sir Kenneth Keith, for one, confronted the
"Eurocentric" ideas of nineteenth century international law:
[Eurocentrism] coincided with the general view then held by
many international lawyers (after the completion of the
European colonization of the Americas, Asia, and Africa) that
international law had a narrow geographic scope; it did not
extend beyond "the civilized and Christian people of Europe"
and those of European origin.43
38 JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 50.
39 Id. at 49. Under principles of customary international law, the requirements for
statehood are: "(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government to
which the population renders habitual obedience; and (d) capacity to enter into
international relations. Modem writers sometimes include two more elements:
independence and sovereignty." Id.
40 Id.
41 LORD MCNAR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 52 (1961).
42 JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 50.
43 Kenneth J. Keith, The Treaty of Waitangi in the Courts, 14 N.Z.U.L. REv. 37
(1990).
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Keith noted that between 1826 and 1910, sixty-five treaties
between European countries, as well as the United States, and
island peoples were given effect.' Ian Brownlie has noted the
"entirely normal" nineteenth century European practice of entering
into binding agreements with tribal societies. 5
Historically, New Zealand courts have consistently declined to
construe the law in light of Maori customary practices.46
However, scholars have recently illuminated trends within the
common law courts of New Zealand, where evidence indicates an
increased effort by judges to construe legislation in light of Maori
customs and family structure.47 Now, virtually all legislative
debates, including the foreshore and seabed controversy, are
analyzed with a mind toward the Treaty.48  Recently,
Parliamentary legislation, after significant debate over consistency
with Treaty principles, has been enacted with final provisions
stating that the Bill "shall not be construed inconsistently with
Treaty of Waitangi principles."49 Such practices almost certainly
are an acknowledgement of a better organized, more politically
powerful, Maori people.
C. The Waitangi Tribunal
During the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Maori were
systematically removed from their land by political machinations
coupled with an omnipresent threat of physical violence." As the
legal and governmental institutions in place consistently offered
no assistance, Maori increasingly turned to the principles
44 Id.
45 IAN BROWNLIE, TREATIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 8 (1992).
46 Taihakurei Durie & Gordon S. Orr, The Role of the Waitangi Tribunal and the
Development of a Bicultural Jurisprudence, 14 N.Z.U.L. REv. 62, 75 (1990). Durie and
Orr note that the practice of not examining law in light of an indigenous people's custom
"reflected the official policy for the amalgamation of Maori into Western social, political
and legal regimes." Id.
47 Id. at 74. For example, courts have become increasingly willing to modify their
legal approaches to the common law property doctrines of partition and alienation in
light of Maori family traditions. Id.
48 Id. at 80.
49 Id. at 79-80; see also Quentin-Baxter, supra note 18, at 52.
50 Durie & Orr, supra note 46, at 62.
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embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi for protection." Maori
political influence gained momentum through mobilization efforts
in the 1960s, culminating with the creation of the Waitangi
Tribunal ("the Tribunal") in 1975.52 The Treaty of Waitangi Act
of 1975 empowered the Tribunal to hear Maori complaints about
Crown practices, measure them against Treaty principles, and
make recommendations to improve the relationship.53 While the
Tribunal does not create law itself, it has been called a "harbinger
of things to come,"54 and its reports are recognized for setting
important precedent. In offering its formal recommendations on
Government legislation, the Tribunal has consistently championed
a "bicultural" approach to government that recognizes Maori
people as important members of the legislative and political
process.55
The Tribunal possesses broad powers to regulate its own
procedures. Pursuant to the Treaty of Waitangi Act, the Tribunal
may commission research, act on unsworn testimony, receive as
evidence statements, documents, information, or other matters that
would otherwise be legally inadmissible, and appoint its own
counsel for a claim.56 Although the Tribunal's powers were slow
to gain recognition, the Tribunal began to hear cases on a diverse
range of political policy questions in the 1980s, including
education, public works, environmental resources, town planning,
and fisheries control.57
D. Maori Land Ownership
During the nineteenth century, the British firmly entrenched
their political control over the whole of the island. Thus, Maori




54 Id. at 63. The Treaty, however, is not formally recognized as a legal document
in New Zealand law, and thus has no force of law. Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 64.
57 Id.
58 Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land: Law and Space in Nineteenth-Century
New Zealand, 24 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 807, 808 (1999). Professor Banner recognizes,
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considerably with the British system of tenurial land ownership,
gradually dissipated. 9
Large portions of Maori land were appropriated in the
nineteenth and early twentieth century by parliamentary acts that
represented little more than pernicious land grabs.6" During the
land wars, Parliament permitted the confiscation of tribal land
from Maori accused of rebellion against the Pakeha government.61
The Maori Land Act of 1862 stripped them of the customary right
of occupation and converted Maori land into freehold estates held
for the benefit of the Crown.62 Several decades later, the 1909
Native Land Act extinguished any right of enforceability Maori
land-holders may have held against the Crown. 63 The Native Land
Act provided that "native customary title to land could not avail
against the Crown. 64 In addition to these two Land Acts, the
Crown made a number of cheap land purchases from Maori chiefs
who possessed a limited conceptualization of the western
monetary valuations attached to the property.65
Since the creation of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975,
protections for the Maori have increased.66 The Tribunal's
appropriately, the fundamental difficulty with using the terms "property systems" or
"property rights" in a comparative setting: "To the extent that the idea of property rights
implies enforcement by a central state, or a market for their transfer, the phrase is no
doubt misleading as applied to precontact Maori culture." Id.
59 Id. at 807.
60 Quentin-Baxter, supra note 18, at 40.
61 Id. at 38.
62 Wiessner, supra note 3, at 70-71.
63 Id. A further example of this type of legislation was the Native Lands Act of
1865, which recognized the policy of the Act was to "encourage the extinction of such
proprietary customs .... Ngati Apa v. Attorney-General [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 6343, para.
40 (C.A.).
64 JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 92. Professor Joseph argues that the Native Land Act
both "consolidated" the Wi Parata doctrine and "empowered the Crown to extinguish
unilaterally Maori customary title over Crown land." Id.
65 See Carter D. Frantz, Getting Back What Was Theirs? The Reparation
Mechanisms for the Land Rights Claims of the Maori and the Navajo, 16 DICK. J. INT'L
L. 489, 492 (1998) (providing historical background about land deals negotiated by the
British with the Maori). That the property would have a valuation in a strictly financial
sense was a concept to which Maori were unaccustomed. See id.
66 See Benjamin A. Kahn, The Legal Framework Surrounding Maori Claims to
Water Resources in New Zealand: In Contrast to the American Indian Experience, 35
STAN. J. INT'L L. 49, 119 (1999) (describing the establishment and powers of the
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investigations and recommendations have led to important actions,
including the recognition by the New Zealand government of a
"trust-like" relationship with the Maori people under the Treaty.
67
III. The Ngati Apa Decision
A. Background Law
New Zealand has long struggled with the problem of native
property rights. In the 1877 case of Wi Parata v. Bishop of
Wellington,68 the issue before the Court of Appeal was a common
law rule that the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty over colonial
lands did not extinguish "native customary property., 69 The Court
found this rule to be inapplicable in New Zealand.7 ° Wi Parata
rested on the dubious late nineteenth century presumption held
among the ruling Pakeha class that Maori lacked a sufficient social
organization "upon which to found custom recognizable by the
new legal order."7 Thus, in Wi Parata, the Court concluded:
On the foundation of this colony, the aborigines were found
without any kind of civil government, or any settled system of
law. There is no doubt that during a series of years the British
Government desired and endeavoured to recognize the
independent nationality of New Zealand. But the thing neither
existed nor at that time could be established. The Maori tribes
were incapable of performing the duties, and therefore of
Waitangi Tribunal).
67 Wiessner, supra note 3, at 71. See Part V infra for a full discussion of the role of
the Waitangi Tribunal in the foreshore and seabed dispute.
68 Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington [ 1877] 3 N.Z. Jur. N.S. (S.C.) 72; see Ngati
Apa v. Attorney-General [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 643, para. 19 (C.A.). The Wi Parata Court
began: "The title of the Crown to the territory of New Zealand was acquired, jure
gentium, by discovery and priority of occupation, the territory being inhabited only by
savages." Id.
69 Ngati Apa para. 23. Prendergast C.J. considered Maori to have "insufficient
social organization upon which to found custom recognizable by the new legal order."
Id. Further: "[T]he supreme executive Government must acquit itself, as best it may, of
its obligation to respect native proprietary rights, and of necessity must be the sole
arbiter of its own justice." Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. (emphasis added). See generally Spencer, supra note 24 (describing the
complexity and sophistication of the Maori society at the signing of the Treaty of
Waitangi).
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assuming the rights, of a civilised community.
In the 1963 case, In Re Ninety Mile Beach, the Native Land
Court, the precursor to the Maori Land Court, investigated Maori
customary title in the foreshore and concluded that "Maori
customary title to land depended 'wholly on the grace and favour'
of the Crown. 7 3  In recognizing full Crown ownership in the
foreshore, Ninety Mile Beach relied on the controversial rule
announced in Wi Parata.4
Among those in the common law world, New Zealand's stance
on native property rights, adopted in Wi Parata and affirmed in
Ninety Mile Beach, was in the distinct minority." Courts in the
United States, Great Britain, Canada, and Australia had, in a line
of cases dating as far back as 1823, applied a rule that "native
customary title, until lawfully extinguished, encumbers the radical
title claimed by the Crown on the assumption of
sovereignty.... "76  The Wi Parata doctrine did not escape
criticism by the Privy Council,77 which, though centered in
72 WiParata, [1877] 3 N.Z. Jur. (N.S.) S.C., at 77.
73 Brookfield, supra note 9, at 34.
74 N.Z. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, SUBMISSION ON THE FORESHORE AND SEABED OF
NEW ZEALAND 6-7 (2003), at http://www.nzbr.org.nz/documents/submissions/submission
s-2003/foreshore.pdf.
75 Brookfield, supra note 9, at 295.
76 Id. See also Mabo v. Queensland, 175 C.L.R. 1 (1992) (preserving the land
entitlement of the inhabitants of the Murray Islands as native title); R. v. Sparrow [1990]
1 S.C.R. 1075 (stating that an aboriginal fishing right was not extinguished by
government regulations). But see Johnson v. Mc'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)
(ruling that an aboriginal title to lands granted to private individuals cannot be
recognized in United States courts), questioned in Alabama-Coushatta Tribe v. United
States, 28 Fed. Cl. 95 (Fed. Cl. 1993). Professor Brookfield notes that the Ninety Mile
Beach rule was "far from the widely accepted understanding of the nature of property
rights of a native people who have been colonized by the British Crown." Brookfield,
supra note 9, at 295.
77 See Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker [1901] A.C. 561; Brookfield, supra note 9, at 295.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Privy Council served as the final destination for
appeals from throughout the British Empire. McDOWELL & WEBB, supra note 16, at
245. During the twentieth century, as colonies asserted sovereignty and the Empire
steadily disintegrated, many, including New Zealand, retained the services of the Privy
Council. Id. New Zealand abolished the Privy Council appeal in 2003, instituting a
stand alone Supreme Court in its capital city, Wellington. Helen Tunnah, Appeals to
London Abolished, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 15, 2003, available at http://www.
nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfrn?thesection=news&thesubsection=&storylD=3528924&r
eportlD=762591. In 2004, only a smattering of tiny nations and principalities have
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London, was New Zealand's court of final appeal.7 8 Despite harsh
criticism, the case was never expressly discredited until the Ngati
Apa decision, where the Court of Appeal adopted a view in line
with the majority of common law nations.79
B. The Ngati Apa Decision
1. Procedural History
In 1993, the Maori Land Court was established and granted
jurisdiction to hear land claims to determine the status of land
under the Maori Land Act ("the Act").8" Four years after its
creation, several Maori iwi, or tribes, brought suit in the Land
Court in an effort to have the foreshore and seabed of the
Marlborough Sounds region declared Maori customary title under
common law.81 Under the terms of the Act, if the Land Court
issues a declaration of customary title, the Court may then seek an
investigation of title to the land and, at its discretion, grant an
order to vest the land as a Maori freehold estate to the persons
found to be entitled to it.8" Granting an interim decision, the Land
Court recognized it had jurisdiction to investigate the title of the
foreshore and seabed, although it reserved judgment on the
specifics of the case at bar.83 On appeal, the case went to the
Maori Appellate Court, then to the High Court, and finally to the
Court of Appeal for clarification of several points of law.84
retained this right of appeal. Margaret Wilson, Confident of our Ability to be
Responsible for Courts, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 16, 2003, available at http://www.nzherald.
co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?thesection=-news&thesubsection=&storyID=3528993&reportlD=
762591.
78 See N.Z. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 74, at 6-7; see also Nireaha Tamaki
v. Baker [1901] N.Z.P.C.C. 371.
79 Ngati Apa v. Attorney-General [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 643, para. 13 (C.A.).
80 Id. para. 2.
81 Id. para. 3.
82 See N.Z. BusINEss ROUNDTABLE, supra note 74, at 5 (focusing on a broad
analysis of the public policy issues raised by the Ngati Apu decision).
83 See id.
84 Ngati Apa at para. 5. The Maori Land Court and Maori Appellate Court are
courts of limited jurisdiction, while the High Court and Court of Appeal are courts of
general jurisdiction.
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2. Analysis
In the Court of Appeal, the Crown challenged the Maori Land
Court's ruling by invoking the reasoning of Ninety Mile Beach and
Wi Parata.85 In Ngati Apa, the Court forcefully rejected Ninety
Mile Beach and Wi Parata, declaring the rule to be "wrong" and
proffering that it "should not be followed. 8 6  Notably, in
overruling Ninety Mile Beach, the Court made clear that Ngati Apa
did not represent a "modem revision" of the law but rather that the
Ninety Mile Beach Court had been incorrect from the time the
decision was handed down."
The Court of Appeal decision only addressed whether the
Maori Land Court had jurisdiction to investigate native iwi claims
of customary title in the foreshore and seabed of New Zealand's
waters.88 The Court declined to reach the second issue on appeal:
whether the law actually recognized "any Maori customary title to
all or any part of the foreshore."89
By deciding the case without addressing this second issue, the
Court avoided delving into two delicate legal queries.90 First, the
judges avoided ruling on the effect of the Treaty of Waitangi
Fisheries Claim Settlement Act of 1992 on customary law
claims.91 This Act ostensibly "settled Maori claims to commercial
fishing, clarified Maori rights to customary or non-commercial
fishing, and discharged the Crown's obligations in respect to
Maori commercial fishing interests under the Treaty of
Waitangi. 92  Some Maori customary interests, according to the
Court, may have been "affected by the terms of the settlement," 93
although the Court avoided any in-depth analysis of this issue.
Second, the Court reserved judgment on the vitality of the
85 In Re Ninety Mile Beach [1963] N.Z.L.R. 461.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. para. 90.
89 Id. para. 6 (emphasis added).
90 Brookfield, supra note 9, at 297.
91 Ngati Apa v. Attorney-General [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 643, para. 10 (C.A.).
92 Kristi Stanton, Comment, A Callfor Co-Management: Treaty Fishing Allocation
in New Zealand and Western Washington, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 745, 753 (2002).
93 NgatiApa para. 10.
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Foreshore and Seabed Endowment Revesting Act of 1991 94 which
some academics have argued cannot be reconciled with the Maori
Land Act of 1993. 9' The Revesting Act purports to "revoke
certain endowments of foreshore and seabed and re-vest those
endowments with the Crown." 96 Whether Maori customary land is
included as part of the Revesting Act is unclear at this point,97 and
the issue likely requires further litigation before its relevance to
the Court's decision may be discovered.
IV. The Government's Response to Ngati Apa
Since Ngati Apa was handed down in June 2003, the debate on
the issue of the foreshore and seabed has been both broad and
fierce. Asserting its sovereignty, the Government responded to the
Court of Appeal by proposing a re-ordering of the foreshore and
seabed legal framework that would undermine the Ngati Apa
decision.98
A. The Government's August Proposal
In light of New Zealand's absolute Parliamentary supremacy,
the Government is free to return the law to its pre-Ngati Apa roots,
provided it culls the votes necessary for the passage of legislation
on the issue.99 Just two months after the Court of Appeal decided
Ngati Apa, the Government issued a blistering rebuke of the new
legal framework established in the decision.' In a document
entitled the Government Proposals for Consultation, the
Government set forth four principles with regard to the future of
the foreshore and seabed:
(1) Principle of Access: The foreshore and seabed should
94 See id. para. 64-76.
95 Brookfield, supra note 9, at 297.
96 Ngati Apa para. 64.
97 Brookfield, supra note 9, at 297.
98 See Foreshore and Seabed: A Framework, supra note 5, at 1-3.
99 See JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 472.
100 See Richard Boast, Foreshore and Seabed: Latest Developments, [2003]
N.Z.L.J. 404 (2003). Boast incredulously notes that the titling of the document is
misleading. See id. ("[Government Proposals for Consultation] was not, or was not
only, a set of 'proposals.' It was an announcement that certain decisions had already
been taken.").
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be public domain with open access and use for all New
Zealanders;
(2) Principle of Regulation: The Crown is responsible for
regulating the use of the foreshore and the seabed on
behalf of all present and future generations of New
Zealanders;
(3) Principle of Protection: Processes should exist to
enable the customary interests of whanau, hapu, and
iwi in the foreshore and seabed to be acknowledged and
specific rights to be identified and protected;
(4) Principle of Certainty: There should be certainty for
those who use and administer the foreshore and seabed
about the range of rights that are relevant to their
actions.101
The Government further clarified its intent to bypass the Ngati
Apa framework by establishing a policy that would eliminate all
private title in the foreshore and seabed as well as remove any
ability for Maori to obtain a freehold title from a customary
property interest. 102 The principle of access appears to
contemplate a desire by the Government to appropriate all existing
private titles in the foreshore. Such private titles are thought,
however, to be limited in number because the law governing
Crown land grants presumes "that a grant bounded by the coast
takes its boundary at high water mark."1 °3 Nevertheless, all sides
agree that if an iwi currently possesses a private right of title to a
section of the foreshore, then the Crown would be required to pay
just compensation for seizing the title. 14
Following the release of the Government Proposals for
Consultation, the Government held a number of consultation hui1°5
with Maori throughout the country. 6 Non-Maoris were not
included in the hui,1°7 but the Government allowed any individual
or organization to submit a paper offering comment on the
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. See also Crown Grants Act, 1908, § 35 (N.Z.).
104 Richard Ogden, The Foreshore and Seabed Issue, [2004] N.Z.L.J. 14, 15 (2004).





proposed new rules.1 °8 At eleven organized hui in marae'0 9 around
the country, the Government heard from nearly 200 Maori orally
and received written submissions from hundreds more.11°
Unsurprisingly, Maori overwhelmingly rejected the proposed new
policy and angrily protested the lack of Maori voice in the
formulation of the Government framework.111  Many Maori
considered the consultation process to be an unmitigated
disaster. 112
B. Dissent Stirs and the Government Responds
Maori and non-Maori alike voiced concern with the
abbreviated consultation period following the initial policy
paper. 1"' Several organizations complained that the six-week
deadline for submissions on the foreshore and seabed allowed no
time for an in-depth review and analysis of the Government's
proposals.1 4  Others faulted the failure on the part of the
Government and the New Zealand television and print media to
fully engage with the wider public.115
108 See DEP'T OF PRIME MINISTER & CABINET, N.Z. Gov'T, Analysis of the
Submissions Received in Response to Government Proposals for Consultation, available
at http://www.beehive.govt.nz/foreshore/report/foreshore-seabed-report- full.pdf
[hereinafter Submissions Analysis]. Over 2,100 written submissions were received. Id.
at 3.
109 Marae are sacred meeting houses located on Maori tribal lands. Glossary,
RECOGNISING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 10, at xvii.
110 Submissions Analysis, supra note 108, at 3. Over 3,000 Maori attended. Id.
111 See Boast, supra note 100, at 405 (indicating that the hui were a fairly
predictable failure).
112 See Submissions Analysis, supra note 108, at 11 (denoting Maori dissatisfaction
with the proceedings).
113 Id. at 9-11.
114 Id. at 11. St. Columba's Havelock North Environmental Group, for example,
explained their frustrations with the speedy process this way:
Our group has given the report initial consideration but feels it has not had the
time to fully grasp or explore all the implications. We believe that the issue
needs very careful thought, that is has the potential to be very divisive, and that
Maori deserve both the courtesy of adequate time for consideration and a fair
hearing.
Id. at 9.
115 Id. at 7-10. One submission, from a Lecturer in Land Tenure Studies, asserted
that: "The media has been left as the only avenue for discussion and as such it has
emphasised the sensational and radical, and been of little help in a real explanation of the
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Of the written submissions proffered, fewer than 30%
endorsed the four principles of the Government's policy
proposal." 6 Despite widespread opposition to the new foreshore
and seabed framework, the Government forged ahead. After the
Government reviewed the written submissions and the hui were
concluded, Prime Minister Helen Clark, on December 17, 2003,
announced the Government's formal proposal to re-order the
ownership in the foreshore and seabed "in the best interests of all
New Zealanders.""' 7 Prime Minister Clark noted that the foreshore
and seabed, under the new policy, will be held in perpetuity "by
the people of New Zealand, with open access and use for
everybody.""18
Guided by the four principles set forth in the Government's
August proposal," 9  the Government's December proposal
framework seeks to vest ownership of the foreshore in "all New
Zealanders."'12 To effect this policy, the Government proposed
the establishment of a "public domain" title: "Current provisions
in law which deem to vest the foreshore and seabed in the Crown
will be repealed and replaced with a public domain title, vesting




The new proposal carefully delineates between the statutory
and common law concepts of customary title.122 The Government
is seeking to develop a statutory conception of customary title that
law, or tikanga Maori, or public rights." Id. at 7.
116 Id. at 17. The Government Submission Analysis explained: "Many respondents
were strongly opposed to the four principles, including almost all Maori and many non-
Maori" (emphasis added). Id.
117 Press Release, Rt. Hon. Helen Clark, Foreshore and Seabed: An Exercise in
Relationship Building, Dec. 17, 2003, at http://www.beehive.govt.nz/viewDocument.
cfm?DocumentlD- 18666.
118 Id.
119 See N.Z. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 74.
120 N.Z. GOV'T, Foreshore and Seabed: Frequently Asked Questions and Answers,
Dec. 17, 2003, available at http://www.beehive.govt.nz/foreshore/foreshore-seabed.
faq.pdf. Note that those who own private title to various areas of the foreshore and
seabed under the Land Transfer Act will retain that title. Id. at 1. Those lands under
private ownership are relatively few. Id. at 3.




will run concurrently with the public domain title in the entirety of
the foreshore and seabed.12 1 Under the proposed legislation, the
statutory title would: (1) recognize that the customary title holder
has an ancestral connection over a particular area of the foreshore
and seabed; (2) provide the holder "an enhanced ability to
participate in relevant local and central government decision
making processes" relevant to the titled foreshore area; and, (3)
include "annotations that identified any specific customary rights"
as identified by the Maori Land Court.
124
The Government's proposal ultimately abrogates all potential
Maori claims of common law customary title in the foreshore and
seabed 125 and, thus, effectively legislates-away the core holding of
Ngati Apa. In many respects, the Government's December
proposals represent a compromise. 126 Though Maori were stripped
of potential private freehold ownership rights in the foreshore and
seabed, they were ceded a position of authority in the debate over
future uses of the area. 2 ' Whether this represents an equitable
trade-off is decidedly unresolved.
V. The Waitangi Tribunal's Response
A. The Waitangi Tribunal Weighs In
In late 2003, in response to the Ngati Apa decision and the
Government's proposals, several claimants brought an application
for urgent inquiry before the Waitangi Tribunal. Hearings were
scheduled for six days at the end of January 2004, and in March,
the Tribunal issued its preliminary "Findings and
Recommendations."' 2 8 Before the Tribunal began its examination
of the substantive claims regarding the breach of the Treaty of
Waitangi, it acknowledged the Government's ultimate authority on
the issue "to do what it wishes."' 129 At the same time, however, the
Tribunal gently implored the Government to carefully consider its
123 Id. at 4-5.
124 Id. at 4.
125 Id.
126 Brookfield, supra note 9, at 37.
127 Id.
128 TRIBUNAL REPORT, supra note 1.
129 Id. at xii.
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findings that the proposed new foreshore and seabed policy
breaches the Treaty of Waitangi.
130
First, the Tribuanl found that the Government's proposal
breaches Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi. The English
language version of Article Two of the Treaty guarantees Maori
"full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and
Estates, Forests, Fisheries, and such other Properties as they may
collectively or individually possess."' 31 According to the Tribunal,
Government's policy will remove courts' jurisdiction to grant
customary title in the foreshore and seabed.' The restriction on
Maori being able to enter a court to have a property interest
declared represents a breach of this Article, under Tribunal
analysis.13 1
Next, the Tribunal found fault with the Government under the
"equal treatment" doctrine of Article Three. Article Three
provides: "Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the
Natives of New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them
all the rights and privileges of British Subjects."' 3 4 The Tribunal
again premised its reasoning on the Government's proposed
abolition of Maori common law rights in the foreshore and
seabed.3 5 With the removal of these common law rights, Maori
will no longer be able to claim fee simple title in the Land
Court.'36 As a result, Maori will be stripped of the right to enter a
court to have a claim enforced by judicial decree.' Since no non-
Maori's land is affected, the Government's policy, the Tribunal
argues, wrongly abrogates Maori claims only and, thus, represents
a violation of the principle of equal treatment.1
38
Under the Treaty, the foundation of the Crown-Maori
relationship lies in the principle of reciprocity, which implies each
130 Id. at xiv-xv.
131 Id. at 127.
132 Id. at 128.
133 Id.







party both receives and owes certain privileges and obligations.139
Courts have described the relationship as something of a
"partnership" with each partner owing the other the "utmost good
faith, which is the characteristic obligation of partnership."
'1 40
Thus, the Tribunal concluded with the finding that the
Government violated the partnership ideal of good faith by
appropriating Maori property rights: (1) before they were even
clearly defined; (2) without consent; and (3) in the absence of
exigent circumstances, such as war."4' The Tribunal harshly
rebuked the Government for an unfairness "of a character that flies
in the face of the norms of good government in developed
societies,' 42 faulted the Government for appropriating a property
right without just compensation,'43 and found the process
inherently prejudicial, declaring that Maori citizenship had been
devalued and placed in the position of a lesser class.
144
B. The Tribunal's Recommendations - But Will the Crown
Listen?
The Waitangi Tribunal concluded its report with several
recommendations.'45 The first recommendation is simply entitled
The Longer Conversation.46  The Tribunal noted that the
139 Id. at 130. The Tribunal has in the past noted: "The basic concept [of the Treaty]
was that a place could be made for two peoples of vastly different cultures, of mutual
advantage, and where the rights, values, and needs of neither would necessarily be
subsumed." Id.
140 Id. at 130-3 1.
141 Id. at 13 1.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 136.
144 Id. The Tribunal concluded: "This discrimination provides the basis for an
enduring and justified sense of being wronged, and marginalises Maori in a way that we
fear will threaten the harmony of race relations. The prejudice to Maori-and indeed to
our society as a whole--can hardly be overstated." Id. at 136-37.
145 See id. at 139-43.
146 Id. at 139. Auckland University Associate Professor of Law David Williams
favors a "longer conversation," and calls the Government's Foreshore and Seabed Bill an
interruption of "due process." David Williams, Controversial Legislation Needs Further
Discussion, N.Z. HERALD, May 6, 2004, available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz.
Professor Williams faults the Government's lawyers for being ill-prepared for the Ngati
Apa ruling, despite the fact that the legal reasoning underpinning the decision is
essentially in line with the trend in the common law in other Commonwealth countries.
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complexity of the issues underlying the foreshore and seabed
debate warrant a "longer conversation" in resolution of the
controversy.' In addition, the Tribunal noted that the parties may
still reach a settlement agreement.' a In this author's opinion, an
agreement which arrives with input from both poles seems
superior to a policy enacted in a summary fashion by a controlling
political bloc-coalition.
The Tribunal's second recommendation is for the Government
to take no action.'49 Under this approach, the courts would be free
to run their course on the foreshore and seabed issue, allowing for
a better-tailored policy approach from the Government when the
time is appropriate, after the issues have been clearly delineated by
the litigation. 50  The government's current proposal seeks to
legislate against concerns that are entirely theoretical at this point
in time.15 According to the Tribunal, once the cases have been
subject to the judicial process, the Government will then have a
better idea of the needs and aspirations on both sides of the
debate. '52
In the final analysis, the most important suggestion the
Tribunal offers may be one in which the Government and the
Maori are forced to spend time with each other to work through
the issues.'53 The Tribunal concluded that the two sides are not
really as far apart as they might think and that a dialogue between
the Government and Maori would create a cohesive policy from
which all New Zealanders truly benefit. 54
VI. Conclusion
In delivering its proposed policy, the Government worked
Id.
147 TRIBUNAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 139.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 140-41.
151 Id. at 140.
152 Id. at 141.
153 Id. at 144.
154 Id. Concludes the Tribunal: "Whatever happens, we hope for an outcome that is
faithful to the vision of the Treaty: two peoples living together in one nation, sharing
authority and resources, with fundamental respect for each other." Id.
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assiduously to convince the public that the new foreshore and
seabed framework was "consistent with the principles of the
Treaty of Waitangi.""' Following the release of the Waitangi
Tribunal's report on April 8, 2004, the Government introduced the
Foreshore and Seabed Bill for full debate before Parliament 56 In
line with the Government's proposals, the proposed Foreshore and
Seabed Bill would vest "ownership of the foreshore and seabed in
the Crown."'57  In conjunction with the introduction of this
legislation, the Prime Minister confirmed the Government's intent
to keep the foreshore and seabed free from private title:
"Ownership of the foreshore and seabed has long been considered
to lie with the Crown. These areas are important to all New
Zealanders and everyone must be able to use and enjoy them now
and in the future."'5 Maori may, however, apply for "ancestral
recognition" that will lend them an undefined voice in the
management of New Zealand's coast.'59
Public hearings on the Foreshore and Seabed Bill are in
progress, although opponents of the measure have been vexed by
the Foreshore Select Committee's decision to hold hearings in
only New Zealand's largest cities: Wellington, Christchurch, and
Auckland. 6 °  The Government has received more than 4,000
submissions on the Bill.' 6' The chief substantive law complaint by
Maori and many non-Maori was that the proposals breached the
155 Foreshore and Seabed. 4 Framework, supra note 5, at 1.
156 N.Z. Gov'T, Foreshore and Seabed Bill, available at http://www.knowledge-
basket.co.nz/gpprint/docs/bills/20041291 .txt (last visited 29 Aug. 2004).
157 Peace Movement Aotearoa, Foreshore and Seabed Information: The Foreshore
and Seabed Bill 2004, available at http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/fsbill.htm (last
visited 29 Aug. 2004).
158 Press Release, Rt. Hon. Helen Clark, Access Guaranteed for All New
Zealanders, Apr. 7, 2004, available at http://www.beehive.govt.nzViewDocument.
cfm?DocumentlD= 19392.
159 Ruth Berry, Final Foreshore Deal Revealed, N.Z. HERALD, Apr. 8, 2004,
available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz.
160 Ruth Berry, MPs get ID cards for foreshore hearing amid security fears, N.Z.
HERALD, Aug. 25, 2004, available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz. News was issued of a
potential "security issue" at a public August meeting of Parliament's foreshore select
committee in Auckland. Id. Rumors of a large, and potentially incensed, crowd led to
the issuance of identity cards to Members of Parliament participating in the forum. Id.
161 MP's Set Cracking Pace to Hear Views, N.Z. HERALD, July 29, 2004, available
at http://www.nzherald.co.nz.
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Treaty and violated New Zealand law) 62 Many powerful interest
groups oppose the Bill, including the Seafood Industry Council,
the New Zealand Maori Law Society, the New Zealand Business
Roundtable, 63  and the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries
Commission."4 Thus far, the Government has heard complaints
from a Maori Studies professor and the chief executive of the
Maori Language Commission that the Foreshore and Seabed Bill
could trigger civil war in New Zealand.'65 In addition,
Transpower, the national electricity operator, has warned that the
Bill could "jeopard[ize] the long-term and secure transmission of
electricity around the country."1 66  Peace Movement Aotearoa
criticized the "essentially meaningless set of new 'rights"' created
by the Bill. 67  Maori tribal representatives condemned the
162 Submissions Analysis, supra note 108, at 11.
163 Id. The Business Roundtable is generally concerned that presently existing
private property rights be upheld, and that the courts are the correct place for Maori to
pursue claims to title. Id.
164 Id.
165 Auckland University Professor of Maori Studies Margaret Mutu warned of a
coming "civil war" over the Government's proposed Foreshore and Seabed Bill.
Professor Mutu remarked: "The warning by a senior civil servant of the inevitability of
civil war if this bill is enacted is not hyperbole." Simon Collins, 'Bloodshed' if Seabed
Bill Passed, Professor Warns, N.Z. HERALD, Aug. 26, 2004 available at
http://www.nzherald.co.nz. Professor Mutu compared the situation in New Zealand to
Israel and Palestine. Ruth Berry and Jon Stokes, Maori Leader Chides Mutu for
'Inflammatory Remarks, N.Z. HERALD, Aug. 27, 2004, available at
http://www.nzherald.co.nz. Professor Mutu's remarks were denounced by many,
including the Waitangi Fisheries Commission Chairman, who labeled the remarks "a
gross distortion" and "appalling." Id. The chief executive of the Maori Language
Commission, Haami Piripi, has made similar remarks to Professor Mutu's. In a written
submission on the Foreshore and Seabed Bill, Piripi stated,
In the face of its own Court of Appeal decision, a Waitanti Tribunal
recommendation, and the overwhelming objection by Maori people, the
Government had continued down a path of action which is confiscating in
nature and contrary to the principles of natural justice .... This country could
be brought to its knees by internal conflict and civil war over the coming
decades as a direct result of this bill.
Audrey Young, Clark's Anger Subsides of 'Civil War' Submission, N.Z. HERALD, Aug.
3, 2004, available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz.
166 Ruth Berry, Foreshore Bill 'Threat to Electricity,' N.Z. HERALD, July 29, 2004,
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storyprint.cfin?storylD=3581031.
167 Peace Movement Aotearoa, Foreshore and Seabed Information: The Foreshore
and Seabed Bill 2004, available at http://www.converge.org.nz.pma/fsbill.htm (last
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Government's plan as a veiled attempt at expropriating private
property rights.168
Three different institutions with three different outlooks
weighed in on the issue of Maori customary title in the foreshore
and seabed. The only opinion that counts is the Government's,
however. 69  If nothing else, this issue raises fundamental
questions of fairness. Under New Zealand's system of
parliamentary sovereignty, it seems as if no check exists where the
Government seeks to hurry through legislation with a speed that
raises legitimate questions. The foreshore and seabed debate is
premised on a difficult and highly technical body of law. That in a
matter of ten months, a landmark court ruling was issued, a wholly
new Government policy was set down, and an independent
commission was able to conduct hearings and write a massive
report boggles the mind and forces one to consider whether the
Government's actions have been in good faith. The Government's
Foreshore and Seabed Bill has been roundly condemned by groups
representing vastly disparate interests. Perhaps it is time to heed
the advice of those level-headed participants who advocate a
"longer conversation" to work out the kinks in this plan.
CHRISTIAN N. SIEWERS, JR.
visited 29 August 2004).
168 Ruth Berry, Final Foreshore Deal Revealed, N.Z. HERALD, Apr. 8, 2004,
available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz.
169 See discussion supra part II.A.
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